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Abstract
In this paper, we discuss a voting model in which voters can obtain
information from a finite number of previous voters. There exist three
groups of voters:
(i) digital herders and independent voters,
(ii) analog herders and independent voters, and
(iii) tanh-type herders.
In our previous paper [1], we used the mean field approximation for
case (i). In that study, if the reference number r is above three, phase
transition occurs and the solution converges to one of the equilibria.
However, the conclusion is different from mean field approximation. In
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this paper, we show that the solution oscillates between the two states.
A good (bad) equilibrium is where a majority of r select the correct
(wrong) candidate. In this paper, we show that there is no phase
transition when r is finite. If the annealing schedule is adequately
slow from finite r to infinite r, the voting rate converges only to the
good equilibrium.
In case (ii), the state of reference votes is equivalent to that of
Kirman’s ant colony model, and it follows beta binomial distribution.
In case (iii), we show that the model is equivalent to the finite-
size kinetic Ising model. If the voters are rational, a simple herding
experiment of information cascade is conducted. Information cascade
results from the quenching of the kinetic Ising model. As case (i) is
the limit of case (iii) when tanh function becomes a step function, the
phase transition can be observed in infinite size limit. We can confirm
that there is no phase transition when the reference number r is finite.
2
1 Introduction
While collective herding behaviour is popularly studied among animals, it
can also be observed in human beings. In this regard, there are interesting
problems across the fields of sociology [2], social psychology [3], ethnology
[4][5], and economics. Statistical physics has been an effective tool to analyse
these macro phenomena among human beings and has led to the develop-
ment of an associated field, sociophysics [6][7]. For example, in statistical
physics, anomalous fluctuations in financial markets [8][9] and opinion dy-
namics [10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17] have been discussed.
Most individuals observe the actions of other individuals to estimate pub-
lic perception and then make a choice similar to that of the others; this is
called social learning. Because it is usually sensible to do what other people
are doing, collective herding behaviour is assumed to be the result of a ra-
tional choice that is based on public perception. While this approach could
be viable in some ordinary cases, as a macro phenomenon, it can sometimes
lead to arbitrary or even erroneous decisions. This phenomenon is known
as an information cascade [18]. In this paper, we show that an information
cascade is described by the Ising model.
In our previous paper, we introduced a sequential voting model [19]. At
each time step t, one voter opts for either of two candidates. As public
perception, the tth voter can see all previous votes, that is, (t − 1) votes.
To identify the relationship between information cascade and phase transi-
tion, we introduce two types of voters—herders and independents. We also
introduce two candidates.
The herders’ behaviour is known as the influence response function, and
threshold rules have been derived for a variety of relevant theoretical sce-
narios representing this function. Some empirical and experimental evidence
supports the assumption that individuals follow threshold rules when making
decisions in the presence of social influence [20]. This rule posits that indi-
viduals will switch from one decision to another only when sufficiently many
others have adopted the other decision. Such individuals are called digital
herders [1]. From our experiments, we observed that human beings exhibit a
behaviour between that of digital and analog herders, that is, the tanh-type
herder [21]. We obtained the probability that a herder makes a choice under
the influence of his/her prior voters’ votes. This probability can be fitted by
a tanh function [22].
Here, we discuss a voting model with two candidates. We set two types of
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voters: independents and herders. As their name suggests, the independents
collect information independently, that is, their voting depends on their fun-
damental values and rationality. In contrast, the voting of herders is based on
public perception, which is visible to them in the form of previous votes. In
this study, we consider the case wherein a voter can see the latest r previous
votes.
When r →∞ is the upper limit of t, we can observe several phenomena
[1]. In the case where there are independent voters and digital herders,
the independents cause the distribution of votes to converge to one-peak
distribution, a Dirac measure when the ratio of herders is small. However,
if the ratio of herders increases above the transition point, we can observe
the information cascade transition. As the fraction of herders increases, the
model features a phase transition beyond which a state where most voters
make the correct choice coexists with one where most of them are wrong.
Further, the distribution of votes changes from one peak to two peaks.
In the previous paper, we discussed the finite r case [1]. We analysed the
model by using mean field approximations and concluded that information
cascade transition occurs when r ≥ 3. In this paper, we discuss the model
from other perspectives and show that there is no phase transition when r
is finite and the solution oscillates between two equilibria. Furthermore, we
show relations among our voting model, Kirman’s ant colony model, and
kinetic Ising model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we intro-
duce our voting model and mathematically define the two types of voters—
independents and herders. In section 3, we discuss the case where there are
digital herders and independents. In section 4, we verify the transitions be-
tween voting choices through numerical simulations. In section 5, we discuss
the case where there are analog herders and independents and show the re-
lation between our voting model and Kirman’s ant colony model. In section
6, we discuss the relation between our voting model and the kinetic Ising
model. In the final section, we present the conclusions.
2 Model
We model the voting of two candidates, C0 and C1. The voting is sequential,
and at time t, C0 and C1 have c0(t) and c1(t) votes, respectively. In each time
step, one voter votes for one candidate. Hence, at time t, the tth voter votes,
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after which the total number of votes is t. Voters are allowed to see just r
previous votes for each candidate; thus, they are aware of public perception.
r is a constant number.
We assume an infinite number of two types of voters—independents and
herders. The independents vote for C0 and C1 with probabilities 1 − q and
q, respectively. Their votes are independent of others’ votes, that is, their
votes are based on their own fundamental values.
Here, we set C0 as the wrong candidate and C1 as the correct one in order
to validate the performance of the herders. We can set q ≥ 0.5, because we
believe that independents vote for C1 rather than for C0. In other words, we
assume that the intelligence of the independents is virtually accurate.
In contrast, the herders’ votes are based on the number of previous r
votes. At time t, the information of r previous votes are the number of
votes for C0 and C1:c
r
0(t) and c
r
1(t), respectively. Hence, c
r
0(t) + c
r
1(t) = r
holds. If r > t, voters can see t previous votes for each candidate. For the
limit r → ∞, voters can see all previous votes. We define the number of all
previous votes for C0 and C1 as c
∞
0 (t) ≡ c0(t) and c∞1 (t) ≡ c1(t).
Now we define the majority’s correct decision. If the ratio to the candidate
C1 who is correct is c1/t > 1/2(< 1/2), we define the majority as correct
(wrong). This ratio is important to evaluate the performance of the herders.
In this paper, we consider three kinds of herders, namely digital, analog, and
tanh-type herders. We define zr as zr = c
r
1/r. The probability that a herder
who refers zr votes to the candidate C1 is defined as f(zr). Digital herders
always choose the candidate with a majority of the previous r votes, which
is visible to them [1]. In this case, f(zr) = θ(zr−1/2), where θ is a heaviside
function. Analog herders vote for each candidate with probabilities that are
proportional to the candidates’ votes [19]. Thus, f(zr) = zr. The other
herder is the tanh-type herder, who is an intermediate between analog and
digital herders [21]. In this case, f(zr) = 1/2(tanh(zr − 1/2) + 1).
The independents and herders appear randomly and vote. We set the
ratio of independents to herders as (1− p)/p. In this study, we mainly focus
on the upper limit of t. This refers to the voting of infinite voters.
3 Digital herder case
In this section, the herder is a digital herder [1], and hence, votes for the
majority candidate; if cr0(t) > c
r
1(t), herders vote for the candidate C0. If
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cr0(t) < c
r
1(t), herders vote for the candidate C1. If c
r
0(t) = c
r
1(t), herders vote
for C0 and C1 with the same probability, that is, 1/2.
In the previous paper, we discussed this case by using mean field approx-
imations [1]. In this paper, we discuss this using stochastic partial differen-
tial equations. First, we consider an approximation to introduce the partial
differential equations. The voter selects r votes randomly from the latest
previous r voters with overlapping. We can write the process as
c1(t) = k → k + 1 : Pk,t:l,t−r = pπ((k − l)/r) + (1− p)q,
c1(t) = k → k : Qk,t:lt−r = 1− Pk,t, (1)
where c1(t − r) = l. Pk,t and Qk,t are the probabilities of the process. The
sum of Pk,t and Qk,t is 1. This means that at time (t − r), the number of
votes for C1 is c1(t−r) = l. Here, we define π(Z) as the majority probability
of binomial distributions of Z. π(Z) can be calculated as follows:
π(Z) =
(2n + 1)!
(n!)2
∫ Z
0
xn(1−x)ndx = 1
B(n+ 1, n+ 1)
∫ Z
0
xn(1−x)ndx, (2)
where r = 2n + 1.
For convenience, we define a new variable ∆t such that
∆t = 2c1(t)− t = c1(t)− c0(t). (3)
We change the notation from k and l to ∆t and ∆t−r for convenience. Given
∆t = u and ∆t−r = s, we obtain a random walk model:
∆t = u→ u+ 1 : Pu,t:s,t−r = π(1
2
+
u− s
2r
)p+ (1− p)q,
∆t = u→ u− 1 : Qu,t:s,t−r = 1− Pu,t.
We now consider the continuous limit ǫ→ 0,
Xτˆ = ǫ∆[t/ǫ],
P (x, τˆ) = ǫP (∆t/ǫ, t/ǫ), (4)
where τˆ = t/ǫ,rˆ = r/ǫ and x = ∆t/ǫ. On approaching the continuous limit,
we can obtain the stochastic partial differential equation (see Appendix A):
dXτˆ =
[
(1−p)(2q−1)−p+2p(2n+ 1)!
(n!)2
∫ 1
2
+
Xτˆ−Xτˆ−rˆ
2r
0
xn(1−x)ndx
]
dτˆ +
√
ǫ,
(5)
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where we used (2). The equation (5) depends on Xτˆ−rˆ and is the feedback
system.
We are interested in the behaviour ofXτˆ in the limit τˆ →∞. The relation
between X∞ and the voting ratio to C1,Z is 2Z − 1 = X∞/τˆ .
We can assume the stationary solution to be
X∞ = v¯τˆ + (1− p)(2q − 1)τˆ , (6)
where v¯ is constant. Substituting (6) into (5), we can obtain
v¯ = −p+ 2p · (2n+ 1)!
(n!)2
∫ 1
2
+
(1−p)(2q−1)
2
+ v¯
2
0
xn(1− x)ndx. (7)
Equation (7) is self-consistent with a permission of overlapping. It is the
same as the mean field approximation in [1]. If we set n = 2r + 1 → ∞,
which is the second term of RHS, the herders behave as digital herders and
(7) becomes the strict form for them.
When r = 1, 2, there is only one solution of (7) in the range p. However,
when r ≥ 3, there is only one solution in p < pc and three solutions in p > pc,
where pc is critical p [1]. The middle solution is unstable, while the other
two solutions are stable. As there exist both good and bad equilibria, there
may be phase transitions.
In the case where r → ∞, the description is correct. In fact, there is
phase transition when r is infinite. The voting rates converge to one of the
two stable points. However, when r is finite, the solution oscillates between
good and bad equilibria. Hence, there is no phase transition. We elaborate
this below.
Here, we consider a random walk between the two states, cr1(t)/r > 1/2
(good equilibrium) and cr0(t)/r > 1/2 (bad equilibrium).
1 We define the
hopping probability from the state cr0(t)/r > 1/2 to c
r
1(t)/r > 1/2 as a and
that from the state cr1(t)/r > 1/2 to c
r
0(t)/r > 1/2 as b. Note that a and b are
not the function of t. When t > r, the transition matrix A of this random
walk is
A =
(
1− a a
b 1− b
)
. (8)
The random walk of the two states, X˜n, is defined as the transition matrix
A when t > r and the initial condition X˜0 = 0. If r > t, voters can see t
previous votes for each candidate.
1It is coarse-grained votes and corresponds to the block spin transformation [23].
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The model was studied as a one-dimensional correlated random walk
[24][25]. For the limit t→∞,
X˜∞ =⇒ N(a− b
a + b
t,
4ab(2− (a+ b))
(a+ b)3
t), (9)
where N(µ, σ2) is the normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2. (See
Theorem 3.1, in [24]). a and b are given in (8).
If consecutive independent voters choose the candidate C1(C0) when c
r
0(t)/r >
1/2(cr1(t)/r > 1/2), the state changes from c
r
0(t)/r > 1/2(c
r
1(t)/r > 1/2)
to cr1(t)/r > 1/2(c
r
0(t)/r > 1/2). Thus, independent voters behave as a
switch for hopping. When the independents voters who vote C1(C0) are the
majority, the state hops from cr0(t)/r > 1/2(c
r
1(t)/r > 1/2) to c
r
1(t)/r >
1/2(cr0(t)/r > 1/2). Hence, the hopping rates a and b are estimated to be
a = π[(1− p)q] = (2n+ 1)!
(n!)2
∫ (1−p)q
0
xn(1− x)ndx ∼ (1− p) r+12 q r+12 ,
b = π[(1− p)(1− q)] ∼ (1− p) r+12 (1− q) r+12 , (10)
where the approximations are in p ∼ 1. In the case where r = 1, a = (1−p)q
and b = (1− p)(1− q). We obtained an identical solution in [19].
In the finite r case, the hopping rates a and b do not decrease as t increases
and the state oscillates between good and bad equilibria. Hence, the distri-
bution of Xτˆ becomes normal and there is no phase transition. The voting
rates converge to (1−p)q+ pa/(a+ b) ∼ (1−p)q+ pq r+12 /(q r+12 +(1− q) r+12 ).
The first term is the number of votes by independent voters and the second
term is the number of votes by the digital herders. The herders’ votes oscil-
late between good and bad equilibria in (7). As r increases, the stay in the
good equilibrium becomes longer. The ratio of stay in the good equilibrium
to that in the bad equilibrium is a/b ∼ ( q
1−q
)r+1/2.
When r = ∞, we consider two cases. One is the case where r increases
with t. Also, in this case, r increases rapidly, that is, the annealing schedule
is not adequately slow [26]. The voters can refer to all historical votes. The
hopping rates a and b decrease exponentially as t increases, and v¯ converges
to the solutions of the self-consistent equation (7). Hence, above pc, which is
the critical p, the voting rate could converge to the bad equilibrium. Thus,
this is the information cascade transition.
The other case is where r increases slowly, that is, the annealing schedule
is adequately slow. At first, we set a finite r. After an adequate number of
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votes, the state frequently oscillates between good and bad equilibria. We
increase r after several oscillations of the states. We continue this process
until r reaches ∞. Thus, we deem the annealing schedule to be adequately
slow. (See section 4, where the schedule r ∼ log t.) The ratio of stay in
the good equilibrium to the bad equilibrium is a/b ∼ ( q
1−q
)r+1/2 → ∞. It
means that the state is always in the good equilibrium, and the voting rate
converges only to the good equilibrium (1− p)q + pa/(a+ b)→ (1− p)q + p
when r is large.
In Figure 1, we depict the convergence as r increases. (a) is the case
where r increase rapidly, or the annealing schedule is not adequately slow. v¯
converges to one of the solutions of the self-consistent equation (7). Hence,
the average correct ratio E(c1(t)/t) decreases above pc, as p increases. The
average correct ratio is the ratio of the number of votes for the candidate C1
to all votes. Further, (b) is the case where r and p increase slowly from finite
r. In this case, the voting rate converges only to the good equilibrium.
4 Numerical Simulations
To confirm the analytic results of section 3, we performed numerical and
Monte Carlo (MC) integration of the master equation for the digital herder
case. For the Monte Carlo study, we solve the master equation for 106 times
and calculate the average value of ratios.
In Figure 2, we show the average votes ratio for the correct candidate vs
p for q = 0.6 and r = 5, 101 and r = ∞. For the time horizon t, we choose
t = 102, 104, and 106 in order to observe the limit behaviour t→∞. We also
plot the theoretical results for the limit value as
lim
t→∞
E(c1/t) = (1− p)q + p a
a + b
, (11)
where a, b are given in (10). The thin solid line plots the exact result of the
limit value. For p < pc = 1/6, the herders make the correct choice and it
behaves as (1−p)q+p·1. Above pc, the probability that all herders choose the
wrong candidate becomes finite and it becomes smaller than (1− p)q + p · 1.
When r = 5 and t = 102, E(c1(t)/t) slightly increases with p for small p.
For large p, the probability that the system is in the bad equilibrium becomes
large and E(c1(t)/t) becomes small. As p increases further, the probability
that the system escapes from the bad equilibrium becomes negligibly small
9
Figure 1: Illustration of voting rate convergence using the analogy of physical
potential. The ball stops at the bottom of the potential, corresponding to the
convergence of the voting rate. The deeper (shallower) potential corresponds
to good (bad) equilibrium. (a) is the case where r = ∞. As the annealing
schedule is not adequately slow, sometimes, the voting rate converges to the
bad equilibrium and there is information cascade. (b) is the case where the
annealing schedule is adequate slow. If we increase r slowly, the voting rate
converges only to the good equilibrium.
and it approaches the limit value for r = ∞. As t increases from 102 to
104, 106, the probability that the system is in the bad equilibrium decreases
and E(c1(t)/t) becomes larger. As p approaches 1, like in the t = 10
2 case, it
approaches the limit value for r =∞. We also see that E(c1(t)/t) approaches
the theoretically estimated limit value (11) as t becomes large. For the
limit t → ∞, the probability that herders make the correct choice can be
estimated as a/(a+ b). For r = 101, we also see the same feature with r = 5.
Compared with r = 5, for r = 101, the peak position of E(c1(t)/t) in p-axis
becomes smaller and it rapidly approaches the limit value for r = ∞. As
r becomes large, the mean oscillation time between good and bad equilibria
becomes large and the probability that the system escapes from the bad
10
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Figure 2: E(c1(t)/t) vs p for r = 5, 101,∞ and t = 102, 104, 106,∞. The
symbols show the results from numerical studies. The lines represent the
theoretical results. The theoretical results for finite r (11) are plotted with
solid (r = 5) and broken lines (r = 101). For r = ∞, the result is given in
[1] and is plotted with thin solid line. We set q = 0.6.
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equilibrium becomes small. Despite this, the system finally escapes from
the bad equilibrium for the limit t → ∞ and E(c1(t)/t) approaches the
theoretically estimated result. The probability that herders make the correct
choice a/(a+ b) is an increasing function of r, and the slope of E(c1(t)/t) vs
p becomes larger for large r. At r = 100 and q = 0.6, a/(a + b) is almost
one and E(c1(t)/t) goes to one for the limit p → 1. For better correct ratio
E(c1(t)/t) , r should be large. However, in order to realize high value of
E(c1(t)/t), t also should be large. Otherwise, one cannot necessarily realize
a high correct ratio. Therefore, there needs to be a trade-off between time
and correct ratio.
In order to realise the high value for E(c1(t)/t), r should be large. For
large r, for the probability in the bad equilibrium to be small, t should be
large and the system should oscillate several times between the two equilibria.
As the mean cycle of the oscillation behaves as 1/[(1−p)(r+1)/2(1−q)(r+1)/2] =
eCr with C = −1
2
log(1−p)(1−q), a good annealing schedule r(t) is estimated
as
r(t) = log t/C. (12)
The annealing schedule r(t) depends on t logarithmically and is very slow.
 0.55
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 1  10  100  1000  10000  100000  1e+06
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r=3log(t)
Figure 3: Plots of E(c1(t)/t) vs t for r = 5, 11, 21, 51, 101,∞ and r = 3 log t.
We set q = 0.6 and p = 0.5 > pc = 1/6.
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In Figure 3, we plot E(c1(t)/t) vs t for r = 5, 11, 21, 51, 101,∞ and r =
r(t) in eq.(12). We set q = 0.6 and p = 0.5 > pc = 1/6. For r = ∞, the
bad equilibrium is stable and E(c1(t)/t) saturates at low value ∼ 0.6 for
t ≥ 102. For r = 5, the herder’s probability of correct choice is low and
c1(t)/t soon reaches the maximum value ∼ 0.65 at about t = 2 × 102. For
r = 11, E(c1(t)/t) reaches the maximum value for about t = 10
3. As r
increases, the time t needed for the high value of E(c1(t)/t) increases. For
r = 51, c1(t)/t reaches about 0.8 at t = 10
5. If the probability that herders
choose the correct candidate C1 is one, c1(t)/t takes 0.8 = (1 − p)q + 1 · p
for q = 0.6 and p = 0.5. r = 51 is large enough to maximise the limit value
limt→∞ c1(t)/t. If one adopts r(t) = 3 log t as the annealing schedule for r(t),
E(c1(t)/t) increases smoothly to the maximum value 0.8 without saturation
at some value between (1 − p)q + p · 0.5 = 0.55 and the maximum value. If
we adopt r = 51, at t = 106, c1(t)/t reaches the maximum value. However,
for t < 105, E(c1(t)/t) with r = r(t) is higher than that for r = 51. If
we set r = 51, the probability to escape from the bad equilibrium is small
and it is necessary to wait for a long time t for c1(t) to reach the maximum
value. In contrast, for r = r(t), r slowly increases and the probability to
stay in the bad equilibrium is minimised. Furthermore, unnecessary stay in
good equilibrium with medium E(c1(t)/t) is also avoided by increasing r and
smoothly increasing c1(t).
5 Analog herder and Kirman’s ant colony model
In this section, we consider the case of the analog herder [19]. As mentioned
earlier, the herders vote for the candidate with the probability that is pro-
portional to the previous votes ratio that can be referred. The voter can see
the latest previous r voters. The transition is
c1(t) = k → k + 1 : Pk,t:l,t−r = (1− p)q + pk − l
r
=
q(1− ρ) + ρ(k − l)
(1− ρ) + ρr ,
c1(t) = k → k : Qk,t:lt−r = 1− Pk,t:l,t−r = (1− q)(1− ρ) + ρ(r − (k − l))
(1− ρ) + ρr ,
(13)
where c1(t−r) = l. Pk,t:l,t−r and Qk,t:l,t−r are the probabilities of the process.
The voting ratio for C1 is c1(t − r) = l. We changed the parameters from p
13
to ρ, which is the correlation of rth beta binomial model [29]. The relation
between p and ρ is
p =
ρr
(1− ρ) + ρr . (14)
Hence, we can map independent voters and herders to beta binomial distri-
bution. As r increases, 1 − p decreases as 1/r and the independent voters’
ratio decreases.
Here, we consider the hopping rate among r + 1 states kˆ = k − l =
0, 1, · · · , r. The dynamic evolution of the process is given by
kˆ → kˆ + 1 : Pkˆ,kˆ+1,t =
r − kˆ
r
q(1− ρ) + ρkˆ
(1− ρ) + ρr ,
kˆ → kˆ − 1 : Pkˆ,kˆ−1,t =
kˆ
r
(1− q)(1− ρ) + ρ(r − kˆ)
(1− ρ) + ρr ,
kˆ → kˆ : Pkˆ,kˆ,t = 1− Pkˆ,kˆ−1,t − Pkˆ,kˆ+1,t. (15)
This process means that a new vote is added by using the r references,
where the oldest vote of the r references exists. If we set ǫ = 1
2
(1− ρ)/[(1−
ρ)+ρr], 1− δ = (r−1)ρ/[(1−ρ)+ρr], and q = 1/2, we obtain an equivalent
of Kirman’s ant colony model [27], [28]. 2 In our model, there exists a
constraint between the parameters,
2ǫ+
r
r − 1(1− δ) = 1. (16)
Here, we define µr(kˆ, t) as a distribution function of the state kˆ at time t.
The number of all states is r+1. Using the fact that the process is reversible,
we have
µr(kˆ + 1, t)
µr(kˆ, t)
=
Pkˆ,kˆ+1,t
Pkˆ+1,kˆ,t
=
r − kˆ
kˆ + 1
q(1− ρ) + ρkˆ
(1− q)(1− ρ) + (r − kˆ − 1)ρ. (17)
For the limit t→∞, we can obtain the equilibrium distribution
µr(kˆ,∞) = rCkˆ
Πkˆ−1j=0(q(1− ρ) + (jρ))Πr−kˆ−1j′=0 ((1− q)(1− ρ) + (j′ρ))
Πr−1i=0 ((1− ρ) + rρ)
. (18)
2Kirman’s colony model corresponds to r ≥ 2 case.
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It is the (r−1)th beta binomial distribution that is constructed on the lattice
[29]. It is the same distribution as that in Kirman’s colony model.3 The beta
binomial distribution becomes beta distribution for the limit r →∞.
From the central limit theorem, as the distribution of states converges
to the beta binomial distribution, the voting rates for the candidate C1 con-
verges,
lim
t→∞
c1
t
= δq, (19)
where the reference number r is finite and δq is a Dirac measure. Further,
when r → ∞, the distribution of states is the same as the voting rates for
the candidate C1, that is, the beta distribution.
4
Now, we discuss the case where r increases slowly, that is, annealing
schedule is adequately slow. At first, we set a finite r. After an adequate
number of votes, the distribution of states converges to the rth beta binomial
distribution. We increase r after the state converges. We continue this
process until r reaches ∞. We call it the case where the annealing schedule
is adequately slow. In this case, the voting rates for the candidate C1 converge
to the same point, that is, independent voter’s correct ratio q, as the finite r
case.
In the appendix C, we discuss the nonlinear extension of this model,
Aoki’s birth-death processes [31].
6 Tanh-type herder and Kinetic Ising model
In this section, we identify the relation between our voting model and the
infinite-range kinetic Ising model.
The state of the Ising model is denoted by the vector σ = (σ1, · · · , σr+1)
with σj = ±1.
The Hamiltonian is defined as
H(σ) = −J
r+1∑
i 6=j
σiσj , (20)
where J is the exchange interaction.
3They showed the distribution with one parameter. With the constraint that the sum
of the distribution is 1, it is same as the beta binomial distribution, respectively.
4The relations between α, β of parameters of beta distribution and q, ρ are q = α/(α+β)
and ρ = 1/(α+ β + 1).
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We define Fj as a spin flip operator on jth site: Fjσ is the state in which
jth spin is flipped from σ with the other spins fixed. The Markov chain is
characterised by a transition probability wj(σ)per unit time from σ to Fjσ.
Let p(σ, tn) be the probability distribution for finding the spin sate σ at time
tn. Then, the discrete master equation is written as follows:
p(σ, tn+1) = p(σ, tn)− [
∑
j
wj(σ)]p(σ, tn)∆t + [
∑
j
wj(Fjσ)]p(Fjσ, tn)∆t,
(21)
where the second and third terms in RHS are ongoing and incoming proba-
bilities, respectively.
For the master equation (21), we consider the sufficient condition that
p(σ, tn) converges to the equilibrium distribution π(σ) as tn → ∞ is that
the transition probability wj(σ) satisfies a detail balance condition:
wj(σ)π(σ) = wj(Fjσ)π(Fjσ). (22)
This condition is known as reversibility. From this condition, the transition
probability is given as
wj(σ)
Fjwj(σ)
=
π(Fjσ)
π(σ)
=
exp[−σjβhj]
exp[σjβhj]
, (23)
where hj = J
∑r+1
i 6=j σi and an inverse temperature β, in the units where the
Boltzmann constant is 1.
Here, we set
wj(σ) =
1
2
(1− σj tanh βhj). (24)
We define the total number of σi = 1, where i 6= j, is cˆ1 and the total
number of σi = −1, where i 6= j, is cˆ−1. Hence, cˆ1 + cˆ−1 = r. The transition
is given by
σj = 1→ −1 : wj(σ) = 1
2
(1− tanh βJ(cˆ1 − cˆ−1)),
σj = −1→ 1 : Fjwj(σ) = 1
2
(1 + tanh βJ(cˆ1 − cˆ−1)). (25)
Note that as wj(σ) + Fjwj(σ) = 1, the transition does not depend on the
previous state of σj and depends on the other spins σi where i 6= j.
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In an ordinary case, an updated spin is chosen randomly. Here, we con-
sider the case where the updated spin is chosen by the rules. The ordering
of update is from σ1 to σr+1. After the update of σr+1, we update σ1 and so
on. We repeat this process. Hereafter, we define the updated spin σj after n
as σ
(n)
j . The initial condition is σ
(0)
j , where j = 1, 2, · · · , r.
Here, we consider a voting model where all herders are tanh-type herders.
The voter can see the latest previous r voters. The transition is given by
c1(t) = k → k + 1 : Pk,t:l,t−r = 1
2
[tanhλ(
k − l
r
− 1
2
) + 1]
c1(t) = k → k : Qk,t:lt−r = 1− Pk,t:l,t−r, (26)
where c1(t− r) = l and λ is a parameter. (Please see in [21] for details.) The
number of votes for the candidate C1 at time (t− r) is c1(t− r) = l.
We define a new variable ∆t such that
∆t = 2c1(t)− t = c1(t)− c0(t). (27)
For convenience, we change the notation from k to ∆t as in section 3. Given
∆t = u and ∆t−r = s, we obtain a random walk model:
∆t = u→ u+ 1 : Pu,t:s,t−r,t = 1
2
(1 + tanh
λ(u− s)
2r
),
∆t = u→ u− 1 : Qu,t:s,t−r,t = 1
2
(1− tanh λ(u− s)
2r
). (28)
Given that the voter who voted at time (t − r − 1) chose the candidate
C0(C1), the probability that another voter at time t votes to the candidate
C1(C0) is Pu,t:s,t−r,t(Qu,t:s,t−r,t). Hence, (28) means that the hopping rate
is Pu,t:s,t−r,t and Qu,t:s,t−r,t. This is equivalent to (25), where βJ = λ/2r,
cˆ1− cˆ−1 = u−s. We use the relations cˆ1 = k− l, cˆ−1 = r−(k− l), u = 2k− t,
and s = 2l − (t− r).
If we consider the row of spins σ
(0)
1 · · ·σ(0)r+1σ(1)1 · · ·σ(n)r+1σ(n+1)1 · · · where
n = 0, 1, 2 · · · as the voting row. Hence, the voting model is equivalent to
the infinite-range kinetic Ising model. This is why we can find the same
mean field approximation equation as that in the Ising model in the limit
r → ∞ case [21]. Thus, for the finite r case, we confirm that there is no
phase transition [1] and that it is not appropriate to use the mean field
approximation as well.
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When r → ∞, the kinetic Ising model is the voting model when the an-
nealing schedule is adequately slow, and the state is always in the good equi-
librium. Hence, the Ising model with external field has no phase transition,
as discussed in sections 3 and 4. In fact, we can confirm as r increases, the
maximum point of E(c1(t)/t) approaches the maximum point of r = 3 log(t),
the slow annealing, in Fig. 4. On the other hand, when the annealing
schedule is not adequately slow, the voting model has the phase transition.
It means that the voting rate could converge to the bad equilibrium. The
phase transition is observed when the size of r is infinite.
In addition, the voting model becomes the Potts model, if there are sev-
eral candidates above two.(See Appendix D.) This is a simple extension of
this section. While in this section, we have discussed the Ising model with-
out external fields, in Appendix E, we discuss how prior distribution and
independent voters correspond to the outer fields of the Ising model.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we investigated a voting model that involves collective herding
behaviours. We investigated the case where voters can obtain the informa-
tion from previous r voters. We observed the states of reference votes and
considered three cases of voters:
(i) digital herders and independent voters,
(ii) analog herders and independent voters, and
(iii) tanh-type herders.
In the previous paper [1], we investigated the case where there were only
digital herders and independent voters. By using the mean field approxi-
mations, we concluded that if r ≥ 3, there occurs a phase transition from
the one-peak phase to the two-peaks phase. In this paper, through numerical
simulations and analysis, we show that for finite r, no phase transitions occur
and that there is only one peak phase.
From the viewpoint of annealing, if the annealing schedule is adequately
slow, that is, r ∼ log t, the voting rate converges to the good equilibrium
only. The correct ratio E(c1(t)/t) increases as r increases. On the other
hand, if the annealing schedule is not adequately slow, that is, r ∼ t, the
phase transitions occur. Further, above pc, there are good and bad equilibria.
The voting rates converge to one of the two equilibria, but we cannot estimate
which of these equilibria is selected. The correct ratio decreases when phase
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transition exists. Therefore, there exists a trade-off between time and the
correct ratio.
In case (ii), we considered analog herders and independent voters. We
show that the states of reference votes in this model are equivalent to Kir-
man’s ant colony model. In this case, the states follow beta binomial distri-
bution and for large r, this becomes beta distribution.
In case, (iii) we show that the model is equivalent to the finite-size kinetic
Ising model. This model follows a simple herding experiment if the voters are
rational [18], [30]. When r → ∞, the voting model behaves as the infinite-
range kinetic Ising model when the annealing schedule is adequately slow.
Hence, the Ising model with external field has no phase transition. On the
other hand, when the annealing schedule is not adequately slow, the voting
model with external fields has the phase transition. While there are many
studies in which the herding behaviour has been analysed by the Ising model
[12], only the current study explains this behaviour by using the kinetic Ising
model.
In this paper, we investigated the model on the 1D extended lattice. Non-
regular topologies have non-trivial effects on the dynamics of the voter model
[7][33]. Determining how these network effects change pcand pvc is one of
our future problems.
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Appendix A Derivation of stochastic differ-
ential equation
We use δXτ = Xτ+ǫ − Xτ and ζτ , a standard i.i.d. Gaussian sequence; our
objective is to identify the drift fτ and the variance g
2
τ such that
δXτ = fτ (Xτ )ǫ+
√
ǫgτ (Xτ )ζτ+ǫ. (29)
Given Xτ = x, using the transition probabilities of ∆n, we get
E(δXτ ) = ǫE(∆[τ/ǫ]+1 −∆[τ/ǫ]) = ǫ(2p[ l/ǫ+τ/ǫ
2
],τ/ǫ
− 1)
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= ǫ[(1− p)(2q − 1)− p+ 2p(2n+ 1)!
(n!)2
∫ 1
2
+
Xτ−Xτ−rˆ
2rˆ
0
xn(1− x)ndx].
(30)
Then, the drift term is fτ (x) = (1−p)(2q−1)+p+2p (2n+1)!(n!)2
∫ 1
2
+
Xτ−Xτ−rˆ
2rˆ
0 x
n(1−
x)ndx. Moreover,
σ2(δXτ ) = ǫ
2[12p
[
l/ǫ+τ/ǫ
2
],τ/ǫ
+ (−1)2(1− p
[
l/ǫ+τ/ǫ
2
],τ/ǫ
)] = ǫ2, (31)
such that gǫ,τ(x) =
√
ǫ. We can obtain Xτ such that it obeys a diffusion
equation with small additive noise:
dXτ = [(1− p)(2q− 1)− p+ 2p(2n+ 1)!
(n!)2
∫ 1
2
+
Xτ−Xτ−rˆ
2rˆ
0
xn(1− x)ndx]dτ +√ǫ.
(32)
Appendix B Analysis of relaxation time
In order to see the relation between the oscillation time and r, we estimate
the relaxation time or integrated correlation time τ for the digital herder
case. We denote the tth vote as X(t), which takes 1(0) if the voter opts for
the candidate C1(C0). We estimate the auto-correlation function d(t) as the
covariance between X(1) and X(t+ 1). That is,
d(t) ≡ Cov(X(1), X(t+ 1)).
The integrated correlation time τ(t) for time horizon t is defined as
τ(t) ≡
t−1∑
s=0
d(s)/d(0).
For r = 1, one can show that d(t) and τ(t) behaves as
d(t) = (q(1− q) + (q − 1
2
)2(2p− p2)) · pt−1
τ(t) =
1− pt
1− p .
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We are interested in the extrapolated value limt→∞ τ(t) to the limit t→∞,
which we denote as τ . For r = 1, we have
τ =
1
1− p. (33)
In Figure 4, (a) plots τ vs p for r = 1, 5, 11, 101 and ∞. In general, τ
is a monotonic increasing function of p and r. For r = ∞, as the system
shows the phase transition at pc = 1/6, τ diverges at pc. For r = 1, τ
behaves as 1/(1−p) and it diverges only at p = 1. It reflects that the system
for r = 1 does not show any phase transition for p < 1. The mean cycle
of the oscillation, which is proportional to τ , is estimated as 1/a + 1/b ≃
1/[(1−p)(r+1)/2(1− q)(r+1)/2]. τ diverges as (1−p)−(r+1)/2 in the limit p→ 1
for finite r. As r increases, τ rapidly increases for the same p. For r = 101
and p = 0.5, τ takes the value of the order of magnitude 105. In order to
escape from the bad equilibrium, t should be as large as the order of 106. In
the case, E(c1(t)/t) takes (1− p)q + p · 1 (Figure 2).
In Figure 4, (b) shows the double-logarithmic plot of τ vs 1 − p for r =
3, 7 and 101. For r = 3, τ diverges as (1 − p)−2, which is consistent with
(1− p)−(r+1)/2 for r = 3. For large r, it is difficult to estimate τ in the limit
1− p→ 0, one can see that the absolute value of the slope rapidly increases
with the increase of r.
At last, we estimate the relaxation time τ for r = ∞ when the analog
herder case. The covariance d(t) between X(1) and X(t+1) is calculated as
d(t) = (q(1− q) + (q − 1
2
)2(2p− p2))
t−1∏
s=0
(
s+ p
s+ 1
)
.
As d(t) behaves as tp−1 for large t, the relaxation time τ(t) for time horizon
t is estimated as
τ(t) ≃
∫ t
0
tp−1dt =
1
p
tp.
τ(t) diverges as tp for p > 0 in the limit t → ∞. This means that the
oscillation time is infinite for r = ∞. For r < ∞, one can show that d(t)
decays exponentially for large t and τ(t) becomes finite in the limit t→∞ for
p < 1. The result is consistent with the result for the digital herder model,
that τ is finite for r <∞ and p < 1.
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Figure 4: Plot of τ vs p (a) and 1 − p (b). τ is the limit value τ =
limt→∞ τ(t). The left figure is semi-logarithmic plot for r = 1 (thin solid),
5 (box), 21 (circle), 101 (triangle) and ∞ (thick solid). The right figure
is double-logarithmic plot of τ vs 1 − p for r = 3 (box),7 (circle), 21 (filled
circle), and 101(triangle). We also plot 1/(1−p)(r+1)/2. We estimate the error
bars as the absolute value of the discrepancies of the extrapolated values for
T = 4× 103 and 2× 103. We set q = 0.6.
Appendix C Aoki’s Birth–Death Processes
In this section, we discuss Birth–Death Processes [31]. The model is a non-
linear extension of Kirman’s ant colony model [27].
We consider the voting model (26), where we consider the hopping rate
among r + 1 states kˆ = k − l = 0, 1, · · · , r. The dynamic evolution of the
process is given by
kˆ → kˆ + 1 : Pkˆ,kˆ+1,t =
1
2
r − kˆ
r
[1 + tanhλ(
kˆ
r
− 1
2
)],
kˆ → kˆ − 1 : Pkˆ,kˆ−1,t =
1
2
kˆ
r
[1− tanhλ( kˆ
r
− 1
2
)],
kˆ → kˆ : Pkˆ,kˆ,t = 1− Pkˆ,kˆ−1,t − Pkˆ,kˆ+1,t. (34)
This is the case
η1(kˆ) =
1
2
[1 + tanhλ(
kˆ
r
− 1
2
)],
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η2(kˆ) =
1
2
[1− tanhλ( kˆ
r
− 1
2
)], (35)
in [31]. From the discussion in section 6, we conclude that this is the Ising
model.
Appendix D Potts model and Information cas-
cade model
Now, we study Bayes’ model for information cascade model [18]. The original
experiment is the estimation of the correct pot by the voting. The difference
between our voting model and the pot model is as follows. The voter casts
his/her vote by using original information as well as information on the pre-
vious votes. The original information is given to each voter in the form of
choice between candidates C1 and C0. We assume that the correct candidate
is the candidate C1. Note that in this case, we do not distinguish between
the herders and independent voters. The voter estimates the posterior dis-
tribution where Ci where i = 0, 1 is the correct candidate by using Bayes’
theorem.
In this section, we consider the extended model of this model. While
originally in this study, the voters choose between two candidates, here, we
consider that the voters choose among ω candidates Ci where i = 1.2. · · · , ω.
We assume that the correct candidate is the candidate C1.
Voters estimate the probability that Ci, where i = 1, 2, · · · , ω, is the
correct candidate by using original information and the information on (r−1)
previous votes. The voters do not distinguish between original information
and reference votes. Hence, the voters have the r votes as the information.
Pr(Ci) is the probability that the voter estimates that Ci is the correct
candidate. We set the prior distribution as Pr(Ci) = 1/ω. Here, we assume
that the voters estimate the percentage of correct answers as qˆ. The sum of
previous voters’ votes and the original information for the candidate Ci is ki.
The total votes are r, r =
∑ω
i=1 ki. The posterior distribution is
Pr(Ci|cr1 = k1, · · · , crω = kω) =
1
ω
r!
(k1)! · · · (kω)! qˆ
ki(1− qˆ)r−ki, (36)
where cri = ki indicates that the number of votes with original information
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for Ci is ki before the individual votes. Then, we obtain
Pr(Cj1|cr1 = k1, · · · , crω = kω)
Pr(Cj−2|cr1 = k1, · · · , crω = kω)
= (
qˆ
1− qˆ )
kj1−kj2 =
eλkj1/r
eλkj2/r
, (37)
where λ = r log qˆ
1−qˆ
.
The state of the Potts model is denoted by the vector σ = (σ1, · · · , σr+1)
with σj = 1, 2, · · · , ω. The Hamiltonian is defined as
H(σ) = −J
r+1∑
i 6=j
δ(σi, σj), (38)
where J is the exchange interaction.
Let p(σ, tn) be a probability distribution for finding the spin sate σ(σj =
j1) at time tn. We define Fj(j1, j2) as a spin flip operator on jth site to be
the state that jth spin is flipped from j1 to j2 with the other spins fixed,
where the jth spin of σ is j2:Fj(j1, j2)σ(σj = j1) = σ(σj = j2).
We define a transition probability wj(σ)per unit time from σ to Fj(j1, j2)σ.
wj(σ) is the probability of that σj hops from j1 to j2. wj(Fj(j1, j2)σ) is the
probability of that σj hops from j2 to j1.
We consider that p(σ, tn) converges to the equilibrium distribution π(σ)
as tn →∞ is when the transition probability wj(σ) satisfies a detail balance
condition:
wj(σ)π(σ) = wj(Fj(j1, j2)σ)π(Fj(j1, j2)σ). (39)
From this condition, the transition probability is given by
wj(σ)
Fj(j1, j2)wj(σ)
=
π(Fj(j1, j2)σ)
π(σ)
=
exp[β(hj(j2)− hj(j1))]
exp[β(hj(j1)− hj(j2))] = e
2β(hj(j2)−hj(j1)),
(40)
where hj(σj) = J
∑r+1
i 6=j δ(σj , σi) and an inverse temperature β, in the units
where Boltzmann constant is 1. hj(σj) is the number of σ = σj without σj .
From (37) and (40), if we set λ/2r = βJ , kj1 = hj(j1) and kj2 = hj(j2),
we identify that these processes are the same.
As r increases, the voting ratio converges to one of the equilibria. The
large r limit in ω = 2 case represents the original information cascade ex-
periment. The voting models and information cascade experiments with ω
candidates are equivalent to the Potts model.
In [12], the real vote data are analysed using Potts model, and it is shown
that the voting behaviour adheres to the model from the macro perspective
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using the real voting data. On the other hand, we have shown the voters
behave as in the Potts model from a micro perspective.
Appendix E Outer field of Ising model
In this section, we discuss the prior distribution and independent voters play
the role of outer fields in Ising model. We consider the case where two
candidates C1 and C0. We assume the correct candidate to be the candidate
C1.
Voters estimate the probability that Ci, where i = 0, 1, is the correct
candidate by using the (r − 1) previous votes and original information. The
voters do not distinguish between original information and reference votes.
Hence, the voters have the r votes as the information. Pr(Ci) is the prob-
ability that the voter estimates that Ci is the correct candidate. The sum
of previous voters’ votes and the original information for the candidate C1 is
cr1 = k. Total number of votes for the candidate C0 and C1 is r. We set the
prior distribution as Pr(C1) = pˆ. Here, we assume that the voters estimate
the percentage of correct answers as qˆ.
We obtain, as in the previous section,
Pr(C1|cr1 = k)
Pr(C0|cr1 = k)
= (
pˆ
1− pˆ)(
qˆ
1− qˆ )
2k−t = e2λ(k−
r
2
)/r+2h, (41)
where λ = t log qˆ
1−qˆ
and h = 1
2
log pˆ
1−pˆ
. We obtain the correspondence,
hˆ
J
=
h
βJ
=
2r
λ
h, (42)
where βJ = λ/2r. hˆ = h/β corresponds to the outer fields in the Ising
model. In [32], we discussed the analog herder case with prior distribution
as the outer field when there are three candidates or more. Thus, if herder
is the tanh-type, the model is equivalent to the Potts model with outer field.
(See the Appendix D.)
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